Abstract In this paper, we study an inexact steepest descent method, with Armijo's rule, for multicriteria optimization. The sequence generated by the method is guaranteed to be well-defined. Assuming quasiconvexity of the multicriteria function we prove full convergence of the sequence to a critical Pareto point.
Introduction
The steepest descent method with Armijo's rule for real continuously differentiable optimization problem (see, for instance, Burachik et al. [8] ), generates a sequence such that any accumulation point of it, if any, is critical for the objective function. This was later generalized for multicriteria optimization by Fliege and Svaiter [11] , namely, whenever the objective function is a vectorial function. The full convergence result for real optimization problem was assured when the solution set of the problem be non-empty and the objective function is convex (see Burachik et al. [8] ) or, more generally, a quasi-convex function (see Kiwiel teria optimization and ii) the "variational rationality" approach of the "theories of change" of Soubeyran [26, 27, 28, 29] .Change problems consider "why, how, and when" it is worthwhile to move from a bad or not so good situation x ∈ X to a better one y ∈ X (known or unknown), the limit case of full rationality being an optimizing one, the case of bounded rationality being a better one (in a lot of different formulations, depending of the context). The variational rationality approach examines two polar kinds of "change problems", choice and transformation problems: i) adaptive choice problems like the "choosing the context to choose" problem (the formation of consideration sets), and ii) transformation problems like creation and destruction, invention, innovation, the evolution of institutions, dynamics interactions (dynamic games), health, behavioral, organizational and cultural changes, . . . in Economics, Decision theory, Management, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, Sociology, Applied Mathematics (Variational Analysis, Optimization and Variational Inequalities). In this "variational context" our present paper shows how setting joint distal and proximal goals greatly help to reach a distal goal. It offers an "aspiration driven local search proximal algorithm". This variational approach emphasizes, each step of the process, two main variational principles (among others, in more general settings): a "satisficing-but not too much sacrificing" principle and a "worthwhile to change" principle. Because the state space of situations is the Euclidian space X = R n , changes u = y − x from a given situation x to a hopefully better situation y can be characterized by their directions v ∈ X and their depth (length) t > 0. In this context where u = tv these two variational principles specialize to, i) the choice, each step, of a "satisficing but not too much sacrificing" direction (a directional "satisficingbut not too much sacrificing" principle);
ii) the choice, each step, of a "worthwhile change" (a "worthwhile to change" step length principle).
Self regulation problems
Self regulation considers the systematic activities (efforts) made to direct thoughts, feelings, and actions, towards the attainment of one's goals (Zimmerman [32] ). A goal is a conscious or unconscious mental representation of some future end (to approach or to avoid), more or less distant, abstract (concrete), vague (precise), desirable and feasible.
Goals can be more or less desirable and more or less feasible. Related to the desirability aspects are conscious or not, vague or concrete, distal or proximal, long term or short term, extrinsic or intrinsic, set by others or oneself, individual or collective, learning or performance oriented contents, high or low in commitment . . . . Related to the feasibility aspects are importance, priority, urgency, direction, intensity, difficulty, measurability, Self regulation have two aspects. The positive side of self regulation considers purposive processes where agents engage in goal-directed actions. It examines goal setting, goal striving and goal pursuit processes.
-Goal setting is the mental process of moving from the consideration of distal goals to the formation of more proximal goals. Distal goals are desired future ends (visions, imaginated desired futures), either promotion aspirations (like ideals, fantasies, dreams, wishes, hopes and challenges) or prevention aspirations (like oughts and obligations). They represent desirable but quite irrealistic distal and vague ends (higher order goals). Proximal goals can be wants, intentions, task goals, i.e much more feasible but less desirable intermediate ends (sub goals).
-Goal striving ( goal implementation) examines the transition phase between setting a distal goal and reaching it.
-Goal pursuit (goal revision) focuses on the final phase, after reaching the given goal or failing to reach it.
It examines the role of feedbacks (self evaluations of successes and failures, including the revision of causal attributions and self efficacy beliefs, see Tolli and Schmidt [30] ) in order to revise goals.
The negative side of self regulation considers what an agent must refrain to do instead of what he must do to set and attain some given goal. This negative aspect of self regulation is named self control (overriding of one action tendency in order to attain an other goal). It considers self regulation failures like lack of vision, the inability to transform irrealistic aspirations into intentions and realistic proximal goals (preparation to action problems), procrastination and inertia (starting problems), interruptions, distractions, temptations, lack of feedbacks, lack of interest, perseverance and motivation (on the track problems) and goal disengagement (ends problems).
Our paper considers only the positive aspect of self regulation. It focuses on proximal goal setting activities, examines some aspects of goal revision activities, and renounce to consider goal striving activities.
Setting proximal goals
The Michael Jordan "step by step" principle: The famous basketball player Michael Jordan wrote the following about goal setting in his book (Jordan and Miller [18] ), "I approach everything step by step . . . . I had always set short-term goals. As I look back, each one of the steps or successes led to the next one. When I got cut from the varsity team as a sophomore in high school, I learned something. I knew I never wanted to feel that bad again . . . . So I set a goal of becoming a starter on the varsity. Goal hierarchies and goal proximity: the Bandura dual "proximal-distal" self regulation principle: Bandura [3] argued that people possess multiple systems of goals, hierarchically arranged from proximal goals to extreme distal goals. Goal proximity defines "how far goals are conceptualized into the future". A goal hierarchy interconnects at least three levels of goals: peak goals (higher order goals, like visions, dreams, fantasies, aspirations, ideals, wishes, hopes), distal goals (challenges), and task goals. . . .
A subset of task goals can be subordinate to distal goals which can be subordinate to peak goals. Hence, the proximal goal distinction is relative to the interconnected network of goals, other goal's providing the temporal context). The main point to be emphasized is that distal goals and proximal goals serve different and complementary conative functions (connected to cognition, affect and motivation) related to goal difficulty, goal commitment, psychological distance. . . . i) distal goals define desired ends (enduring aspirations) that attract individuals;
ii) proximal goals regulate immediate conative functions, which provide the ways to find and follow a path of step by step changes moving from the initial situation to approach the desired end or avoid an undesirable end. In this context it is important to distinguish task goals and strategies. The former defines what is to be accomplished, and the later defines how it is to be accomplished (Wood and Bandura [31] ).
The Multicriteria Problem
In this section, we present the multicriteria problem, the first order optimality condition for it and some basic definitions.
++ . Given a continuously differentiable vector function F : R n → R m , we consider the problem of finding a optimum Pareto point of F, i.e., a point x * ∈ R n such that there exists no other x ∈ R n with F (x) F (x * ) and F (x) = F (x * ). We denote this unconstrained problem as
Let F be given by F (x) := (f 1 (x), . . . , f m (x)). We denote the jacobian of F by
and the image of the jacobian of F at a point x ∈ R n by
Using the above equality, the first-order optimality condition for Problem 1 (see, for instance, [11] ) is stated as
Note that the condition in (2) generalizes, to multicriteria optimization, the classical condition "gradient equals zero" for the real-valued case.
In general, (2) is necessary, but not sufficient, for optimality. A point of R n satisfying (2) is called critical Pareto point.
Inexact Steepest Descent Methods for Multicriteria Problems
In this section, we state the inexact steepest descent methods for solving multicriteria problems admitting relative errors in the search directions, more precisely, an approximation of the exact search direction is computed at each iteration, as considered in [11, 14, 12] .
Let x ∈ R n be a point which is not critical Pareto point. Then there exists a direction v ∈ R n satisfying
For each x ∈ R n , we consider the following unconstrained optimization problem in R
Lemma 4.1. The following statements hold:
i) The unconstrained optimization problem in (3) has only one solution. Moreover, the vector v is the solution of the problem in (3) if and only if there exists α i ≥ 0, i ∈ I(x, v), such that
ii) If x is critical Pareto point of F and v denotes the solution of the problem in (3), then v = 0 and the optimal value associated to v is equal to zero;
iii) If x ∈ R n is not a critical Pareto point of F and v is the solution of the problem in (3), then v = 0 and
In particular, v is a descent direction for F at x.
Proof. The proof of the item i can be found in [6] . For the proof of the remaining items, see, for example, [11] . 
with α i = 0 for i ∈ I \ I(x, v). In other words, if S := {e i ∈ R m : i ∈ I} (set of the elements of the canonical base of Euclidean space R m ), then w is an element of the convex hull of S(x, v), where
Note that the minimization problem (3) may be rewritten as follows:
In view of the previous lemma and (3), we define the steepest descent direction function for F as follows.
Definition 4.1. The steepest descent direction function for F is defined as
Remark 4.2. This definition was proposed in [11] . Note that, from the item i of Lemma 4.1 it follows that the steepest descent direction for vector functions becomes the steepest descent direction when m = 1.
The optimal value associated to v(x) will be denoted by α(x). Note that the function
is strongly convex with modulus 1/2 and
Proof. See [6] for the proof of the first part. The second part is a immediate consequence of the first.
Note that the exact steepest descent direction at x is a σ-approximate steepest descent direction for F with σ = 0. As a immediate consequence of Lemma 4.1 together with last definition, it is possible to prove the following:
is not a critical Pareto point and v is a σ-approximate steepest descent direction at x, then v is a descent direction for F .
Next lemma establishes the degree of proximity between an approximate direction v and the exact direction v(x), in terms of the optimal value α(x).
Proof. The proof follows from (5) combined with Definition 4.2. See [14] .
A particular class of σ-approximate steepest descent directions for F at x is given by the directions v ∈ R n which are scalarization compatible, i.e., such that there existsw ∈ convS with
Note thatw determines a scalar function g(x) := w, F (x) whose steepest descent direction coincides with v, which justifies the name previously attributed to the direction v; see [14] for a good discussion.
Next proposition establishes a sufficient condition for v, given as in (6), to be a σ-approximate steepest descent direction for F at x.
Proposition 4.1. Let σ ∈ [0, 1) and v as in (6) . If
or equivalently,
then v is a σ-approximate steepest descent direction for F at x.
Proof. See [14] .
From Remark 4.1 we note that, for each x ∈ R n , the steepest descent direction for F at x, v(x), is scalarization compatible. Next lemma tell us that v(x) satisfies the sufficient condition of the last proposition with σ = 0 and, hence, that such condition is natural.
Lemma 4.5. The following statements hold:
Proof. In order to prove the item i note that
Moreover, from Remark 4.1, we have
where convS(v(x)) denotes the convex hull of S(v(x)). So, combining (8) and (9) with the definition of
Hence,
from where it follows the item i. The item ii is an immediate consequence of the item i combined with (8) .
The inexact steepest descent method with the Armijo rule for solving the unconstrained optimization problem (1) is as follows:
Method 4.1 (Inexact steepest descent method with Armijo rule).
Initialization. Take β ∈ (0, 1) and
Stop criterion. If x k is a critical Pareto point STOP. Otherwise.
Iterative
Step. Compute a σ-approximate steepest descent direction v k for F at x k and the steplength t k ∈]0, 1] as follows:
and set
and GOTO Stop criterion.
Remark 4.3. The previous method was proposed by Fliege and Svaiter [11] and becomes the classical steepest descent method when m = 1. Other variants of Method 4.1 can be found in [14, 15, 12] .
Next proposition ensures that the sequence generated by the Method 4.1 is well-defined.
Proposition 4.2. The sequence {x k } generated by the steepest descent method with Armijo rule is welldefined.
Proof. The proof follows from the item ii of Lemma 4.3 combined with the fact that F is continuously differentiable. See [11] for more details.
In this section, we present a partial convergence result without any additional assumption on F besides the continuous differentiability. In the sequel, assuming quasi-convexity of F and following the ideas of [14, 6] , we extend the full convergence result presented in [14] for quasi-convex multicriteria optimization. It can be immediately seen that, if Method 4.1 terminates after a finite number of iterations, then it terminates at a critical Pareto point. From now on, we will assume that {x k }, {v k } and {t k } are infinite sequences generated by Method 4.1.
To simplify the notation, in what follows we will utilize the scalar function ϕ : R m → R defined as follows:
where {e i } ⊂ R m is the canonical base of the space R m . It is easy to see that the following properties of the function ϕ hold:
Partial Convergence Result
The following theorem shows that if F is continuously differentiable then the sequence of the functional values of the sequence {x k }, {F (x k )}, is monotonously decreasing and the accumulation points of {x k } are critical Pareto points. The proof of the next theorem can be found partly in [11] and [14] . We chose to present a proof within this paper.
Theorem 5.1. The following statements hold:
} is a summable sequence and
iii) Each accumulation point of the sequence {x k }, if any, is a critical Pareto point.
Proof. The iterative step in Method 4.1 implies that
Since {x k } is an infinite sequence, for all k, x k is not a critical Pareto point of F . Thus, the item i follows from the item ii of Lemma 4.3 combined with the last vector inequality.
Suppose now that {x k } has an accumulation pointx ∈ R n and let {x ks } be a subsequence of {x k } such that lim s→+∞ x ks =x. Since F is continuous and lim s→+∞ x ks =x we have lim s→+∞ F (x ks ) = F (x). So, taking into account that {F (x k )} is a decreasing sequence and has F (x) as an accumulation point, it is easy to conclude that the whole sequence {F (x k )} converges to F (x). So, from the definition of the function ϕ,
we conclude that {ϕ(F (x k ))} converges to ϕ(F (x)) and, in particular,
From (15), (12), (13) and definition of v k , we obtain
Adding the last inequality from k = 0 to n and taking into account that |α(
Thus, because β ∈ (0, 1) and ϕ(F (x)) ≤ ϕ(F (p n+1 )) (see (16)), from the last inequality, we get
But this tell us that (recall that σ ∈ [0, 1))
from which follows the second part of the item ii. The first part of the item ii follows from last inequality in (18) together with the fact that t k ∈ (0, 1]. 
We have two possibilities to consider:
Assume that item a holds. Then, from (19) , it follows thatv = 0. On the other hand, from the Definition
Letting s go to +∞ in above inequality, it follows thatv = 0 is a σ-approximation steepest descent method for F atx and, from the item i of Lemma 4.3, we conclude thatx is a critical Pareto point of F . Now, assume that item b holds true. Since v ks is a σ-approximation steepest descent method for F at x ks and {x ks } is not a critical Pareto point, we have
where the last inequality is a consequence of the item iii of Lemma 4.1. Hence, letting s go to +∞ in the last inequalities and using that {v ks } converges tov, we obtain
Take r ∈ N. Since {t ks } converges tot = 0, we conclude that if s is large enough,
From (10) this means that the Armijo condition (15) is not satisfied for t = 2 −r , i.e.,
which means that there exists at least one i 0 ∈ I such that
Letting s go to +∞ in the above inequality, taking into account that ∇f i0 and exp are continuous and using that {v ks } converges tov, we obtain
The last inequality is equivalent to
which, letting r go to +∞ and assuming that 0 < β < 1, yields ∇f i0 (x), v(x) ≥ 0. Hence,
Combining the last inequality with (20) and taking into account that σ ∈ [0, 1), we have
Therefore, from the item iii of Lemma 4.1 it follows thatx is a critical Pareto point of F , and the proof is concluded.
Remark 5.1. If the sequence {x k } begins in a bounded level set, for example, if
) and consequently {x k } is bounded. In particular, {x k } has at least one accumulation point.
Full Convergence
In this section, under the quasi-convexity assumption on F , full convergence of the steepest descent method is obtained.
i) H is called convex iff for every x, y ∈ R n , the following holds:
ii) H is called quasi-convex iff for every x, y ∈ R n , the following holds:
where the maximum is considered coordinate by coordinate;
iii) H is called pseudo-convex iff H is differentiable and, for every x, y ∈ R n , the following holds: 
from which we may conclude that H is pseudo-convex. It is easy to obtain an example showing that the reciprocal is false.
Next proposition provides a characterization for differentiable quasi-convex functions.
Proposition 5.1. Let H : R n → R m be a differentiable function. Then, H is a quasi-convex function if, only if, for every x, y ∈ R n , it holds
Proof. Let us assume that, for every pair of points x, y ∈ R n , it holds
Takex,ỹ ∈ R n and assume that holds
Using (22) with y =ỹ and x = (1 − t)x + tỹ, we obtain (1 − t)JH((1 − t)x + tỹ)(x −ỹ) 0, which implies
where h 1 , . . . , h m represent the coordinate functions of H. But this implies that
. . , m}, and, hence, that
which proves the first part of the proposition. The proof of the second part follows immediately from the definition of quasi-convexity combined with differentiability of H; see [6] for more details.
From the previous proposition follows immediately that pseudo-convex functions are quasi-convex. The reciprocal is naturally false. Next proposition provides a sufficient condition for a differentiable quasi-convex function to be pseudo-convex.
Definition 5.2.
A point x * ∈ R n is a weak optimal Pareto point of F iff there is no x ∈ R n with F (x) ≺ F (x * ).
Proposition 5.2. Let H : R n → R m be a differentiable quasi-convex function. If each critical Pareto point of H is a weak Pareto optimal point, then H is a pseudo-convex function.
Proof. Take y ∈ R n . Since that, by hypothesis, each critical Pareto point is an optimal weak Pareto, if y is critical Pareto we have nothing to do. Let us suppose that y is not a critical Pareto point. Then, there exists v ∈ R n such that
Let us assume, by contradiction, that H is not pseudo-convex. In this case, there existsx ∈ R n such that
From (23) and (24), it follows that
Now, since H(x) ≺ H(y), from the continuity of H there exists δ > 0 such that H(z) ≺ H(y) for all z ∈ B(x, δ) (ball with center inx and ray δ). In particular, H(x − (δ/2)(v/ v )) ≺ H(y) and, because H is quasi-convex, we obtain
But this tell us that with β = δ/(2 v ), we have
which is a contradiction with (25) , and the resulted is proved.
Remark 5.3. Consider the following vectorial function H : R → R 2 given by H(t) = (t, −t 3 /3). Note that
H is not compenentwise pseudo-convex because h 2 (t) := −t 3 /3 is not pseudo-convex. However, since H is quasi-convex and each critical Pareto point of H is weak Pareto optimal point for H, from last proposition, it follows that H is pseudo-convex.
We know that criticality is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for optimality. In [6] the authors proved that, under convexity of the vectorial function F , criticality is equivalent to the weak optimality.
Next we prove that the equivalence still happens if F is just pseudo-convex.
iff x is a weak optimal Pareto point of H.
Proof. Let us suppose that x is a critical Pareto point of H. Assume by contradiction that x be not a weak optimal Pareto point of H, i.e., that there existsx ∈ R n such that
As H is pseudo-convex, then (26) implies that
But this contradicts the fact of x being a critical Pareto point of H, and the first part is concluded. The second part is a simple consequence of the fact that F is differentiable with the definitions of critical Pareto point and weak optimal Pareto point. For more details, see [6] .
Definition 5.3. A sequence {z k } ⊂ M is quasi-Fejér convergent to a nonempty set U iff, for all z ∈ U , there exists a sequence {ǫ k } ⊂ R + such that
In next lemma we recall the theorem known as quasi-Fejér convergence.
Lemma 5.1. Let U ⊂ R n be a nonempty set and {z k } ⊂ R n a quasi-Fejér convergent sequence. Then, {z k } is bounded. Moreover, if an accumulation pointz of {z k } belongs to U , then the whole sequence {z k } converges toz as k goes to +∞.
Proof. See Burachik et al. [8] .
Consider the following set
In general, the above set may be an empty set. To guarantee that U is nonempty, an additional assumption on the sequence {x k } is needed. In the next remark we give such a condition.
Remark 5.4. If the sequence {x k } has an accumulation point, then U is nonempty. Indeed, letx be an accumulation point of the sequence {x k }. Then, there exists a subsequence {p kj } of {x k } which converges tō
x. Since F is continuous {F (x k )} has F (x) as an accumulation point. Hence, using {F (x k )} as a decreasing sequence (see item i of Theorem 5.1) the usual arguments easily show that the whole sequence {F (x k )} converges to F (x) and the following relation holds
which implies thatx ∈ U , i.e., U = ∅. Assumption 1. Each v k of the sequence {v k } is a scalarization compatible, i.e., exists a sequence
As was observed in Section 4, this assumption holds if
We observe that the Assumption 1 also was used in [14] for proving the full convergence of the sequence generated for the Method in the case that F is convex. From now on, we will assume that the Assumption 1 holds true.
In next lemma we present the main result of this section. It is fundamental to the proof of the global convergence result of the sequence {x k }.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose that F is quasi-convex and U , defined in (27) , is nonempty. Then, for allx ∈ U , the following inequality is true:
Proof. Consider the hinge x kx , x k x k+1 , α , where x kx is the segment joining x k tox; x k x k+1 is the segment
. By the law of cosines, we have
Thus, taking into account that cos(π
, the above equality becomes
On the other hand, from Assumption 1, there exists w k ∈ convS such that
Hence, the last equality yields
from which, we obtain
Since F is quasi-convex andx ∈ U , from Proposition 5.1 with H = F , x = x k and y =x, we have
So, because w k ∈ convS, we get
Therefore, by combining (28) with (29), the lemma proceeds.
Proposition 5.4. If F is quasi-convex, R n has non-negative curvature and U , defined in (27) , is a nonempty set, then the sequence {x k } is quasi-Fejér convergent to U .
Proof. The resulted follows from the item ii of Theorem 5.1 and Lemma 5.2 combined with Definition 5.3.
Theorem 5.2. Suppose that F is quasi-convex, and U , as defined in (27) , is a nonempty set. Then, the sequence {x k } converges to a critical Pareto point of F .
Proof. From Proposition 5.4, {x k } is Fejér convergent to U . Thus, Lemma 5.1 guarantees that {x k } is bounded and, hence, has an accumulation pointx ∈ R n . Thus, from Remark 5.4, we conclude thatx ∈ U and, hence, that the whole sequence {x k } converges tox as k goes to +∞ (see Lemma 5.1). The conclusion of the proof is a consequence of item iii of Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 5.1. If F is pseudo-convex, R n has non-negative curvature and U , as defined in (27) , is a nonempty set, then the sequence {x k } converges to a weak optimal Pareto point of F .
Proof. Since F is pseudo-convex, and in particular quasi-convex, the corollary is a consequence of the previous theorem and Proposition 5.3.
Variational Rationality: Inexact Proximal Algorithms as Self Regulation Problems
In this section, we consider an endless unsatisfied man, who, instead to renounce, aspires, and partially satisfice, using worthwhile changes.
Variational rationality
1) The course between unsatisfied needs, aspirations, and satisfaction levels
Variational rationality (Soubeyran [26, 27, 28, 29] ) is a purposive and dynamic approach of behaviors. It modelizes the course pursuit between desired ends and feasible means. It is a theory of the endless unsatisfied man, who, given a lot of unsatisfied needs, both renounces to satisfy some of them and aspires to satisfice some others. Let us summarize some of the main points of this conative approach of behaviors, based on cognition (knowledges), motivation (desires) and affect (feelings and emotions), i) the agent, focusing his attention on the unsatisfied needs he has chosen to satisfice, considers desired ends. He forms aspirations (distal goals). Setting aspirations is a way to know what he really wants among all his wishes, without considering if they are realistic or not.
ii) then, the agent starts to consider feasible means (defined as the means he must find, build, gather and learn how to use);
iii) given the difficulty to gather such feasible means, the agent chooses to partially satisfice his aspirations;
Then, the agent self regulates all his goal oriented activities:
iv) goal setting, setting proximal goals is a way for him to divide the difficulty, to better know what he can really do. This allows him to balance between "desired enough" ends and "feasible enough" means; v) goal striving represents the path (way of doing, strategy) the agent chooses to follow and the obstacles he must overcome to attain his successive proximal goals and partially satisfice; vi) goal pursuit is the revision of his goals, using feedbacks coming from successes and failures.
This variational approach is progressive (adaptive). The step by step joint formation of distal (global) and proximal (local) goals and related actions is a process including a lot of interactions, tatonnements, adjustments,. . . , driven by inexact perceptions, evaluations and judgments.
Among several variational principles, three of them are worth mentioning in the present paper,
-the "satisficing with not too much sacrificing" principe and the "worthwhile to change principle" (Soubeyran [26, 27] )
-the "tension reduction-tension production" principle (Soubeyran [28, 29] ).
2) Unsatisfied needs, aspirations, satisfaction and satisfying levels, and aspiration gaps
In the specific case of this paper let us modelize the main motivational concepts of the variational approach of Soubeyran [26, 27] . They include,
a) The map of unsatisfied needs (the needs system). An agent has two ways to perceive, judge and estimate a situation, either in term of unsatisfaction or in term of satisfaction. Usually an agent deals with a lot of unsatisfied needs which depend of his present situation x ∈ X. Let I = {1, 2, . . . , m} be the list of different potential needs. The perceived unsatisfied needs functions are 0 ≤ n i (x) < +∞ be the strength of each perceived need i ∈ I for each situation x ∈ X. Let N : X → R m , given by
be the map of unsatisfied needs in this situation. These needs can be rather vague and abstract. Hull [17] and Murray [24] give an extensive list of different needs.
b) The map of aspiration gaps. As soon as the agent chooses to do not renounce to satisfy, at least partially, all these unsatisfied needs, they become, in this present situation, aspiration gaps a i (x), i ∈ I, although in general, the perceived aspiration gaps a i (x) ≥ 0, i ∈ I are lower than perceived unsatisfied needs: 0 ≤ a i (x) ≤ n i (x), i ∈ I because agents usually aspire to fill no more than their unsatisfied needs.
c) The map of aspiration levels (desirable ends, or the distal goal system). Let us denote by g i (x), i ∈ I, the aspiration levels for x ∈ X. They represent still vague, abstract, and non committed higher order goals (visions, ideals, aspirations, fantasies, dreams, wishes, hopes, wants, and desires). These aspirations levels represent desirable (but perhaps irrealistic) ends. Lewin [21] defines aspiration levels as desirable ends, some being irrealistic in a near future, and others not.
d) The map of satisfaction levels (the experienced utility system). Most of the time unsatisfied needs are partially satisfied. Let G :
, be the map of present satisfaction levels (or outcomes) in the present situation x, where g i (x) ≤ g i (x), i ∈ I, i.e, the levels at which all needs are partially satisfied.
e) The map of discrepancies (the drive system). The differences between aspiration levels and satisfaction levels define more precisely aspiration gaps a i (x) = g i (x) − g i (x) ≥ 0, i ∈ I which are non negative. We will assume in this paper that aspirations gaps are equals to unsatisfied needs, i.e, they represent the discrepancies
because, usually, agents aspire to satisfy their perceived unsatisfied needs, even if, in a second stage, they have not the intention to satisfy all of them. The crude perception of these gaps generates feelings and emotions, the so called drives, Hull [17] .
We consider here satisfaction levels g i (x), i ∈ I, instead of discrepancies. Moreover, for simplification, we consider all aspiration levels as constant, i.e, g i (x) = g i < +∞, i ∈ I, x ∈ X. Then,
The main problem is to know how the agent sets all these levels, step by step (progressively).
3) Feasible means and the "goal system"
A "goal system" (Kruglanski et al. [20] ) comprises i) a cognitive network of mental representations of goals and means which are structurally interconnected by several more or less strong cognitive links, ii) in the short run a subset of limited available resources (physiological, material, mental, social means) because means are scarce and difficult to obtain, iii) an allocation process where goals compete for the use of these limited available resources, iv) a motivational process of goal setting, goal commitment, goal striving and goal pursuit (using affective feedback engendered in response to success and failure outcomes, goal revision including persistence of pursuit, means substitution and the management of goal-conflict). In our specific case the goal system is the satisfaction map
Available means are identied to the situation x ∈ X. These means can represent actions, resources and capabilities "to be able to do" them (see Soubeyran [26, 27] ). The fact that outcomes compete for restricted means can be modelized as follows: we decompose the given x into the sum x = x 1 + x 2 + ...
where x i ∈ X is the bundle of means allocated to goal i and g i = g i (x i ) is the level of satisfaction of this objective.
The proximal "satisficing-but not too much sacrificing" principle
The local evaluation of marginal satisfaction levels of change. Starting from the situation x ∈ X, let v ∈ X be a direction of change, t > 0 be the intensity of change, u = y − x = tv be the change and G x (v) = JG(x)v be the vector of marginal satisfaction levels of change. The related differents needs may have different degree of importance and urgency and, each step, the agent must weight each of them to define priorities. This task (solving trade off) is not easy and must be done progressively. Define g x : R n → R, given by The local search of directions of aspirations. In general (Soubeyran [26, 27] ) the proximal payoff balances desired ends and feasible means. In this paper the proximal payoff l x (v) = g x (v) − c x (v) balances the marginal satisfaction levels and the costs to consider them (local exploration costs). Since
we will say that it is "worthwhile to explore in direction v, starting from x", because the marginal satisfaction level g x (v) in this direction is higher than the costs c x (v) to be able to consider them. For each x ∈ X consider the local search proximal problem: find a direction of change
, v ∈ X} be the optimal proximal payoff function at x and v(x) = arg max {l x (v), v ∈ X} ∈ X be the unique optimal direction of change, starting from x. Then, l x = l x (v(x)).
From Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, it follows that 1) If x ∈ X is Pareto critical, then v(x) = 0 ∈ X and l x = 0.
2) If x ∈ X is not Pareto critical, then l x > 0 and g
3) The mappings X ∋ x → v(x) ∈ X and X ∋ x → l x ∈ R are continuous.
Starting from x and using variational rationality concepts, the optimal direction of change v(x) defines the unique direction of aspiration and the optimal proximal payoff l x = l x (v(x)) defines the proximal aspiration level (net of consideration costs). From Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2, it follows that 1) If x ∈ X is Pareto critical, then the direction of aspiration and the proximal aspiration level are zero.
2) If x ∈ X is not Pareto critical, then, their is a strictly positive direction of aspiration and the proximal aspiration level is strictly positive.
3) direction of aspirations and proximal aspiration levels are continuous
The local determination of a local satisficing direction of change: If x ∈ X is not Pareto critical, i) set a local (net) satisficing level of change l x = σl x , 0 < σ ≤ 1 which is positive and strictly lower than the local aspiration level of change l x > 0. As a "variational rationality" concept (Soubeyran [26, 27] ), this local satisficing level of change l x is situational dependent (it changes with x ∈ X). Simon [25] , the father of the satisficing concept, defines an invariant satisficing level without any reference to an aspiration level of change l x .
ii) Then, the agent will try to find a direction v § ∈ X such that l x (v § ) ≥ l x . This means that the satisficing direction of change v § "improves enough" with respect to the aspiration direction of change v(x), including exploration costs. In variational term such a direction not only satisfices (Simon [25] ) but even more, it balances satisficing ("improving enough") marginal satisfactions to change n x (v) with some sacrifices to change c x (v), because the net satisfaction level l x (v § ) is higher than the (net) satisficing level. This is a local version of the variational "sacrificing with not too much sacrificing" principle (Soubeyran [26, 27] ). This is equivalent to say that the satisficing direction of change v § ∈ X is an inexact solution of the local search proximal problem. In this context proximal goals are local aspiration levels of change and satisficing levels of change.
Remark 6.1. In term of variational rationality, the Fliege-Swaiter [11] steepest descent method appears to be an "aspiration driven local search proximal algorithm". In situation x ∈ X, the distal goal is the aspiration level of change l x and the proximal goal is the satisficing level l x .
The proximal "worthwhile to change" principle and goal difficulty
Inertia matters because to be able to change from some situation x ∈ X to a new improving situation y ∈ X is costly. As variational concepts, there are two kinds of "costs to be able to change" (Soubeyran [26, 27] ): i) consideration costs (perception, exploration, search and evaluation costs . . . ), ii) capability costs to change C(x, y), i.e, the costs to be able to change (to be able to stop to use old means, to be able to use again old means, and to be able to imagine, find, build, gather, and learn how to use new means). Means can be capabilities ( competences, skills), ingredients and resources. In the present paper consideration costs are c x (v) = (1/2) v 2 and capability costs to change are C(x, y) = K [tJG(x)(y − x)] = tJG(x)(y − x), with t > 0. This formulation, specific to the present paper, means that costs to change from x to y increase with the difficulty to change, modelized here as the vector of gradients Λ(x, y) = tJG(x)(y − x), including the step length of change t > 0. Then, the second variational principle tells us that it is "worthwhile to change" from x to y if advantages to change A(x, y) = G(y) − G(x) are higher than some proportion, β > 0, of costs to change, i.e G(y) − G(x) ≥ βC(x, y) where β > 0 is a rate of tolerance which calibrates how the change (transition) x y is acceptable. More generally (Soubeyran [26, 27] ) it is "worthwhile to change" from x to y if motivations to change M (x, y) = U [A(x, y)] are higher than some proportion, β > 0, of resistances to change R(x, y) = Λ [C(x, y)] where U (.) and Λ(.) are the experienced utility and desutility of advantages and costs to change.
The variationel concept of "worthwhile changes" is related to the famous Lindblom [22] "muddling through" economizing principle where agents make small steps (incremental changes, choosing the step size in our context) and successive limited comparisons (balancing pro and cons).
Remark 6.2. Our paper considers quasi-convex (or quasi-concave) payoffs. In term of variational rationality, this case is very interesting, because it allows large flat portions which can be very costly to explore (quadratic exploration costs are "large in the large"). Hence, in this case, convergence is a very nice result.
Local exploration traps
The goal of this paper has been to give conditions of convergence of a path of change towards a Pareto optimum in a multicriteria optimization setting. The variational concept of a behavioral trap (Soubeyran [26, 27] ) appears in this context at the local level of the consideration (say exploration) process. More precisely, we will say that x * ∈ X is a local exploration trap if
This means that, locally, it is not worthwhile to explore, because, whatever the direction of change v ∈ X, marginal advantages to change n x * (v) are lower than local exploration costs to change c x * (v). Lemma 4.1
shows that if x * ∈ X is Pareto critical, then x * ∈ X is a local exploration trap.
